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Fast and Fuzzy Private Set Intersection
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Abstract
Private Set Intersection (PSI) is usually implemented as a sequence of en-
cryption rounds between pairs of users, whereas the present work implements
PSI in a simpler fashion: each set only needs to be encrypted once, after which
each pair of users need only one ordinary set comparison. This is typically
orders of magnitude faster than ordinary PSI at the cost of some “fuzziness”
in the matching, which may nonetheless be tolerable or even desirable. This
is demonstrated in the case where the sets consist of English words processed
with WordNet.
1Email: 1054h34@gmail.com
1 Introduction
Private Set Intersection (PSI) is a process wherein two or more parties compare sets
to mutually discover their intersection without revealing anything else about the
sets [1, 2, 3, 4]. Though important potential applications abound in e.g. medicine,
finance, and networking, a convincingly practical realization of PSI has yet to sur-
face. State-of-the-art techniques employ a series of interaction rounds between users
with compound encryptions of their sets [5, 6], typically taking O(102) milliseconds
to compare small sets consisting of a few hundred elements. This situation is par-
ticularly acute in the context of smartphone apps, where we have probably the most
exciting and relevant use cases of PSI [7, 8], but the severe CPU and memory con-
straints there slow the performance of existing PSI algorithms to seconds or minutes.
This paper introduces an algorithm to implement PSI in a different way: sets
are first encrypted and then compared in one round as ordinary sets. This promises
to be orders of magnitude faster than ordinary PSI in situations where set content
is unvarying over many comparisons, e.g. as would occur in social matchmaking
applications, for then the cost of encryption is amortized over the many comparison
operations. Since the encryption only needs to be done once on the input set after
which it can be compared any number of times to other sets, these encryptions
enjoy the ability to be stored, ported, or subjected to additional layers of security as
desired. Moreover, the technique is naturally suited to sets of extended elements, for
example English words, where intersection is not best expressed as a binary “yes/no”
but rather as a continuous score between 0 and 1.
In this algorithm speed is attained at the cost of an inherent uncertainty or
“fuzziness” in the comparison process: the resultant intersection between the sets
will generally contain false positives (but no false negatives), however these can
be reduced to a tolerable level by methods privy to the particular application at
hand. At the same time, this fuzziness actually assists as a guard against brute-
force decryption, which in addition to being NP-hard thus also produces too many
irreducible false positives to be informational. Fuzziness is therefore more of a feature
than a liability of the algorithm.
The following exposition will define the encryption technique, apply it to an
intuitive geometrical toy example, and then show relevant metrics for a more serious
application to the comparison of English messages parsed with WordNet [9]. Finally,
there will be a brief discussion of potential use cases and future outlook.
2 Proposed Algorithm
2.1 Encryption
The algorithm begins by encrypting each of the two sets to be compared. Since the
encryption procedure is the same for each set, let us focus on one of them, denoted
W .
Though W may in general consist of elements of any type (e.g. strings, integers,
1
floats, etc.) we will assume they are drawn from members of a particular master set
X , i.e. W ≡ {w1, w2, ..., wN} with W ⊆ X ≡ {x1, x2, ..., xP}, P ≥ N .
We will also need a map M defined which takes any x in X to a set of integers
Ωx, valued in R ≡ [0, Imax], for some large positive integer Imax, i.e. M : x→ Ωx. In
particular,
M : wi −→ Ωi
≡ {Ωi1, Ωi2, ...,Ωipi}
with Ωip being the p-th element of Ωi. Then the encryption Sn of W , for a config-
urable parameter n that controls the strength of the encryption, is defined as the
set
Sn ≡ {Ωi1p1 + Ωi2p2 + ...+ Ωinpn}1≤i1<i2<...<in≤N ; p1, p2,...pn (1)
with duplicate elements removed (this turns out to be important for storage and
security purposes later). This is hereafter known as “n-Sum Encryption”. Note that
for Sn to be defined we require W to have at least n elements, i.e. N ≥ n.
The simplest variant, n = 1, gives a set S1 consisting of the union of all the Ωi:
S1 ≡ {Ωi}i≤N (2)
For n = 2 the encryption set is the set of all sums of pairs of integers, each originating
from a different Ωi:
S2 ≡ {Ωip + Ωjq}i<j≤N ; p, q (3)
For n = 3 all triplet combinations must be computed:
S3 ≡ {Ωip + Ωjq + Ωkr}i<j<k≤N ; p, q, r (4)
This pattern extends to higher values of n where one computes quartets, quintets
and so on. For n > 1 we have a legitimate encryption procedure because it is much
easier to sum several numbers than to uniquely reconstruct them from that sum,
this being essentially the NP-hard “subset sum problem” (Appendix A contains an
explicit Python script to perform the encryption which we will make use of later in
Section 4).
Breaking the encryption, i.e. inferring W from Sn given knowledge of M , requires
brute-force search2 and depends strongly on n and Ω.3 For S2, for example, brute
force decryption requires iterating over all pairs (x, y) in R and testing for inclusion
of {Ωxp+Ωyq}p,q in S2, which has quadratic O(I
2
max) time complexity. In addition, a
certain combinatorial uncertainty arises in this procedure, for {Ωxp+Ωyq}p,q may be
included in S2 without either Ωxp or Ωyq being included in any of the Ωi mapped from
2As noted, S1 is not very secure as it suffices to walk through each integer x in R and test Ωx
for inclusion in S1. This can be done in linear O(Imax) time.
3For example, in the degenerate case where Ωi ≡ Ω ∀i, we always have S1 = Ω for any input
set W , thus we can infer nothing about it. The other extreme is where Ωi
⋂
Ωj = 0 ∀i, j, and the
information of Sn is maximized. Indeed here we can uniquely reconstruct W from S1.
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W , i.e. one can expect false positives which are in general irreducible by the subset
sum problem, for knowing a sum of two or more integers does not in general uniquely
identify those integers, even if one knows the set from which they are drawn.
In general, brute force decryption of Sn would require both searching the space
of all n-tuplets in R, taking O(Inmax) time
4, as well as dealing with worsening combi-
natorial uncertainty; already for n ≥ 3 and Imax > 10
8 commodity hardware would
really struggle to search n-tuple space (which here is the size of Avogadro’s number!),
and then only to be swamped with false positives.
2.2 Finding the Intersection
The goal of PSI is for the two users to discover the intersection of their respective
private sets W and W ′. To do this they simply measure the intersection of their
encrypted sets Sn and S
′
n: by construction if both private sets share at least n
elements in common, even partially, this intersection will be non-empty and each
user can easily find which n-tuple(s) are responsible for that intersection, and to
what extent. In the process of computing Sn, for example, the user can build an
inverted dictionary mapping elements of Sn to lists of elements from the {Ωi}. Then
knowing Sn
⋂
S ′n identifies a subset of Sn which the dictionary then maps to a set of
elements Y , and we can assign a ‘matching score’ to each of the original elements wi
given by the ratio |Y
⋂
Ωi|
|Ωi|
.
3 A Geometrical Application
As a toy example, consider the problem of privately determining the geometric inter-
section of two groups of shapes (see Figure 1, and Appendix B for generating code),
assumed rectangular for simplicity though the discussion below will apply just as
well to any shape. This might represent two countries (‘Blue’ and ‘Orange’) which
each want to secretly establish a certain number colonies of various sizes in a given
territory without overlapping with each other, as such overlapping is presumed to
be mutually disadvantageous. It’s in the best interest of each country to know what
the potential conflict areas are, but neither is willing to disclose any other informa-
tion about the locations and sizes of their colonies. Here the private sets are the
respective colonies (wi, 1 ≤ i ≤ N), each of which is mapped to a collection of grid
points (Ωi), suitably hashed
5, that compose the rectangular areas. For example, a
colony centrally located at (10, 10) with a width and height of 3 might be mapped
4the number of terms contributing to Sn increases like
N
n C ≈
Nn
n!
.
5There are several choices here: the trivial hash, i.e. simply numbering coordinate points from
1 to M (= number of grid points in the territory), a flat random hash assigning each coordinate to
a random number between 1 and Imax, or a custom hash taking coordinates to some values with a
given distribution. The trivial hash gives poor results because of a low Imax, e.g. for S2 all bi-sums
are between 0 and 2M and most are degenerate at the peak of a pyramid-shaped distribution; one
does better for a flat random hash with a much larger choice of Imax, or a custom hash designed
such that the distribution of hash values results in a flat distribution of bi-sums.
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to 9 numbers representing the enclosed coordinate points:
Ω{(10,10),3,3} = {a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6, a7, a8, a9}
while another located at (12, 12) with the same width and height would be
Ω{(12,12),3,3} = {a9, a10, a11, a12, a13, a14, a15, a16, a17}
overlapping at exactly one point (a9) as expected. With each country agreeing to the
same standard map M : colony → Ω, they can proceed to compute their respective
Sn and compare these sets to discover their planned colonies’ intersection.
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Overlapping Shapes Problem
Figure 1: Example of the overlapping shapes problem. Orange and Blue wish to discover
their mutual intersection without disclosing anything else about the sizes and positions of
their shapes. In this example there are N = 10 Blue and Orange colonies each with random
widths and heights between 5 and 10 (arb. units), territory size = 50× 50; coordinates are
hashed to random integers between 1 and Imax = 10
8 with flat priors.
For definiteness let the countries compare S2 computed over their respective
colonies. It is now a straightforward procedure for each to map the intersection
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Blue Private Result
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Orange Private Result
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Blue Private Result (filtered)
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Orange Private Result (filtered)
Figure 2: Blue (LEFT) and Orange (RIGHT) views of the world: candidate overlap points
(black) based on raw comparison of encrypted data. After geometric filtering (BOTTOM),
the candidate overlap regions are cleaner and agree almost perfectly with the actual inter-
section (see previous Figure).
back to the original points (encoded in the Ωi) to determine which of these led to the
intersection: the upper plots of Figure 2 show these candidate points in black. There
are false positives in this procedure forming a certain combinatorial background, or
‘fuzziness’, but no false negatives: if a point is not black, it definitely is not in the
actual intersection of the colonies. This stage of the comparison may already be
useful if Orange and Blue simply want to know which parts of their planned colonies
would definitely not be overlapping. But we can do better, for in this case we have a
geometrical way of filtering out most of the false positives: since we know the colonies
are rectangular (and say of a given minimum size, here taken as 5 grid units), candi-
date points must compose rectangular regions of at least that minimum size. After
this filtering, each country obtains a much cleaner representation of the overlap with-
out learning anything else about the other country’s colonies (lower plots of Figure
2), which by comparison to Figure 1 the reader can verify is quite accurate. If we
wanted to report a matching score for each shape, that would simply be given by the
ratio of black to non-black area.
Each country’s S2 is safe against brute-force decryption, which would involve
not only generating a look-up table of encrypted values to points6, but then trying
6In this toy example this is actually easy, as there are only M = 50× 50 = 2500 possible hashed
grid points, thus in principle M2 C = 3 million possible sums (rows in the table).
5
to back-solve to find all the candidate points responsible for the observed S2. As
long as the maximum hash value Imax is sufficiently small the vast majority of the
sample space will be candidate points and very little information is gleaned (see
Figure 3). Note that if Imax is too small then the matching procedure between
the countries likewise becomes uninformative (by the Central Limit Theorem sums
between random integers tend to cluster about a central value7), so for a given setup
there is an optimal value that provides good discrimination for matching but poor
discrimination for brute-force decryption; for the parameters of the present toy model
that balance is struck at roughly Imax = 10
8.
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Brute-Force Decryption of Orange
Figure 3: Result of brute-force decryption of Orange’s S2 data. Shape data is sufficiently
obfuscated.
4 Application to Message Comparison
The motivating application is the comparison of text messages. Like the colonies
of the toy example above, words are intrinsically extended objects that can overlap
with each other, but in semantic space instead of geometric space, e.g. the word
7But see a prior footnote about choice of distribution.
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“fast” shares some semantic overlap with “quick”, “hasty”, and “instant”, all in
differing amounts, and WordNet provides the map from a word wi to its “semantic
territory” Ωi that allows us to compute that overlap. Specifically, each Ωi is a
collection of synonym sets (“synsets” for short) that are represented by a particular
positive integer (“offset” in WordNet parlance)8; they are the result of extensive
linguistic research and generally “make sense”, i.e. given any three words x, y, and
z, if x is semantically closer to y than to z, then typically |Ωx ∩Ωy| > |Ωx ∩Ωz|. It is
useful to keep the analogy to the geometrical application of the last section in mind
with the correspondences of country → message, colony → word, and coordinate →
synset integer, for we really have the same problem in a different guise, i.e. we are
considering the problem of how two users can compare messages in order to discover
their words’ semantic intersection only.
Given an English message then, we map the words to the appropriate numerical
identifiers and apply the cryptographic hash Sn. Note that applying this encryption
to messages is implicitly using the “Bag of Words” NLP model wherein word order,
grammar, and punctuation are ignored. Despite the crudeness of that model, one
can reliably match large classes of messages, in particular those whose meaning is
invariant upon permutation of their words, e.g. “withdraw money tomorrow noon”,
“agriculture thesis topic”, etc. In fact the set Sn applied to the whole message
is equivalent to Sn applied to all possible n-grams constructed from words in the
message.
Let us consider a simple, if somewhat contrived example that we can compute by
hand:
Message 1: “Laser reheat cappuccino”
Message 2: “Laser reheat espresso”
Each word belongs to a particular synset,
“laser” = w1 ≡ 3643253
“reheat” = w2 ≡ 544280
“cappuccino” = w3 ≡ 7920349
“espresso” = w4 ≡ 7920052
8The actual Ωi we use here are computed from the WordNet database as follows: for a given
word wi, we first find all the synsets that contain that word, and for each of these we look up all
of their associated synsets, excepting those of type “antonynm”. Thus Ωi includes all synsets up to
two links removed from wi.
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and we look up the mapping to other synsets in WordNet:
Ω1 = {3643253,3851341,3924532}
Ω2 = {371264,544280}
Ω3 = {7920349,7929519}
Ω4 = {7920052, 7920222, 7929519}
the bold-faced synsets being common to both messages. Following (3), we have
what we need to compute S2 for each message:
S2 = {4014517, 4187533, 4222605, 4295796, 4395621, 4468812, 8291613, 8300783,
8464629, 8473799, 11563602, 11572772, 11771690, 11780860, 11844881, 11854051}
S′2 = {4014517, 4187533, 4222605, 4295796, 4395621, 4468812, 8291316, 8291486,
8300783, 8464332, 8464502, 8473799, 11563305, 11563475, 11572772, 11771393,
11771563, 11780860, 11844584, 11844754, 11854051}
S2
⋂
S′2 = {4014517, 4187533, 4222605, 4295796, 4395621, 4468812, 8300783, 8473799,
11572772, 11780860, 11854051}
Here S2 has 16 keys, S
′
2 has 21, and S2
⋂
S ′2 has 11, giving each message an
“overlap” percentage of 11/16 ≈ 69% and 11/21 ≈ 52%, respectively. In this simple
example each user can easily determine exactly which synsets in their respective
Ωi contributed to that overlap (the bold values) by keeping track with an inverted
dictionary; in this case there is no uncertainty, and thus we say the “confidence” of
matching is 100%.
Brute-force decryption of S2 would again require not only the costly construction
of a look-up table9 but also some way to deal with the inherent combinatorial uncer-
tainty of this process. For example, supposing we wished to brute-force decrypt the
more embellished message “US car production blue sapphire laser millisecond pulse
reheat”, which has 62461 keys: in addition to the message’s actual words, it turns
out the brute-force decryption also returns hundreds of red herring match results for
words like “no-go”, “keyless”, “brainwashed”, and “baptised”. This is analogous to
what brute-force decryption did for us in the geometrical example of the last sec-
tion, i.e return the almost non-informational Figure 3 which basically says that most
points are possibly in the intersection.
In the toy geometrical example we learned that the matching procedure produces
many false positives in addition to real positives, and that there was a simple way to
9In this case for S2 this is still doable, barely: there are M ≈ 1.5 · 10
5 words in WordNet3.1, thus
in principle M2 C = 10 billion possible sums to tabulate; this might fit in the memory of a commodity
server. Doing the same for S3 and beyond would quickly become impractical, however.
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filter out the false positives based on geometrical constraints on the way the rectan-
gular shapes can overlap. Unfortunately in the present case there is no such obvious
filter we can apply: the synsets that represent a word are not localized into any spe-
cial “shapes” in a way that we can leverage, so we’re stuck with false positives in this
procedure10. However, it does turn out that the number of positives (both real and
false) is inversely correlated with the number of false positives. For example, mea-
surement of hundreds of randomly-generated pairs of 10-word messages encrypted
with S2 (see Figure 4) indicates that an overlap between messages above 1% essen-
tially guarantees an absence of false positives, hence a high degree of confidence in
the synsets extracted from this procedure. This is in tune with our expectations for
a system with inherent uncertainty: the larger signal (overlap) available, the higher
one’s confidence in conclusions based on that signal.
4.1 Encryption Storage
The space required to store an encryption Sn is not entirely negligible. For average-
length messages encrypted with S2 one typically produces a list of thousands of keys
(i.e 10-100 KB), and this increases exponentially at higher encryption levels (see
Figure 5). The “US car production blue sapphire laser millisecond pulse reheat”
example as a text file is over 500K, though with bit packing the 62461 keys (each
a 32-bit int) it really only needs half that space. Standard compression tools can
further reduce that by a factor of several [10]; in this way most encrypted messages
typically take the space of a thumbnail image.
4.2 Encryption Speed
Encryption of a set only has to occur once in this algorithm, and this constitutes the
bulk of the overall time spent. Comparison to other sets then follows intersection
algorithms on sorted sets, which are fast: sub-ms for small (< 104 elements) to 10 ms
for large sets with millions of elements [11]. Figure 6 below shows upper-bound timing
metrics for encryption – note these are non-optimized single-threaded speeds, whereas
the algorithm is in fact highly parallelizable (e.g. each n-tuple combination in (1) can
run on its own thread), so these times could easily be an order of magnitude smaller
in a production environment.11 For all but the highest levels of encryption (S4 and
higher) this initial runtime overhead is comparable to what current PSI techniques use
in every set comparison. For situations where one set will be compared multiple times
to other sets, this overhead is amortized over the number of comparisons performed
10Note we could redefine the synset numbers to give a more even sum distribution, e.g. to op-
timize for S2 we choose the distribution of synset numbers such that the distribution of bi-sums
is approximately flat. As the distribution of synset numbers in WordNet is approximately flat,
i.e. ρ(x) ∼ 1, there is potential for improvement if we redistributed according to something like
ρ(x) ∼ 1√
x
+ 1√
Imax−x
.
11Encryption metrics are reported here with non-optimized Python code, show in Appendix A,
not only for both human readability and portability, but also to deliberately produce pessimistic
results.
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Figure 4: The number of keys in the overlap relative to the total number is an indicator of
the cleanliness of the process: for a generic 10-word message encrypted with S2, an overlap
in excess of 1% of the total number of keys essentially guarantees that any synset leading to
the overlap is a true positive.
and we thus quickly attain a speed limited only by ordinary set comparison, which
as mentioned is at least two orders of magnitude faster than current PSI techniques.
5 Use Cases for Fast PSI
Private Set Intersection techniques promise to enjoy a large number of potential
applications, but these are made more feasible by a fast protocol such as the one
proposed. In the social domain, i.e. interest matchmaking, it is quite likely that
users will offer a much more liberal set of interests than they currently do with
public protocols owing to the reassurance that non-matching interests will not be
revealed to anyone. The fact that their private lists can be persistently stored in
encrypted form removes the need for a simultaneous transfer protocol: one-sided
matching is a very fast and practical option. A few examples:
• Privacy-Preserving Social Networking: users compare lists of private profile
descriptors to make relevant new connections.
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Figure 5: Average encrypted set size for private input messages with various numbers of
words for encryption methods S1, S2, S3, and S4. Each point is the statistical average of
100 messages whose words were randomly selected from the WordNet 3.1 database.
• Advertising: marketers compare a list of potential features of the ad with con-
sumers’ private lists of interests in order to predict the ad’s success.
• Scientific Collaboration: researchers compare lists of key words to find potential
collaborators on a topic without announcing their idea or intentions to the public
and risk being scooped.
• Employee Complaint Forum: employees compare lists of concerns to determine
whether a threshold commonality of complaints is reached, prompting manage-
ment for reform with minimal danger of incrimination.
• Social Organizing: individuals compare lists of place+time+topic in order to
effect a spontaneous social gathering.
• Meeting Agendas: participants submit private lists of desired topics, and the
overlap is used to draw up an agenda.
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Figure 6: Average processing time required for encryption of private input messages gener-
ated for the previous figure. Encryption code was executed single-threaded and non-optimized
using the Python 2.6.7 compiler on a commodity laptop (Intel i7-2640M CPU @ 2.80GHz,
4.00 GB RAM).
• Corporate Benchmarking: companies compare confidential lists of assets to de-
termine ranking (a sort of generalization of Yao’s “Millionaire Problem” [12]).
On larger organizational or governmental scales there are many more promising
applications, e.g.
• Medicine: patients’ medical records are compared to a specific ‘filter list’ in
order to identify and process records without accessing them in entirety.
• Law Enforcement: a federal agency needs to compare its confidential list of
suspects with some other institution’s likewise confidential list of registrants.
• Personalization: multi-component systems can compare lists of users’ attributes
to certain criteria in order to identify recurrent users and provide a personalized
experience.
• Routing Optimization: network nodes compare lists of private attributes such as
capacity and flow constraints in order to determine a globally optimal routing.
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• Central Command Processing: a central unit can publicly broadcast a single
command (encrypted list of goal keywords) which worker-units compare with
their own private list of qualifications in order to effect the appropriate action,
maximizing communication efficiency and security.
6 Conclusions and Remarks
This paper introduces a new Private Set Intersection technique using n-Sum encryp-
tion that should be many times faster than current techniques when any given set
is likely to undergo multiple comparisons in its lifetime. The speed increase is due
to the fact that, after an initial one-time encryption of each set, all subsequent com-
parisons proceed by ordinary comparison of ordered sets, and many well-studied fast
algorithms exist for this.
The technique is mathematically simple and flexible in that one has a choice
of which mapping of set elements M : x → Ω to use. Specifying the technique
in terms of an abstract map M has the advantage of decoupling: different choices
of M , be they versions of WordNet or customized hashes, can be tailored to the
application in hand. In general M is chosen to make reporting of partial intersection
between set elements feasible and meaningful, with the traditional binary ‘yes/no’
reporting a result of choosing a trivial Ω, i.e. M : x → x. As this is mostly a
proof-of-concept paper, the technique is likely to be highly optimizable, leveraging
especially the highly-parallelizable nature of the algorithm, and adaptable to different
technologies.
Security in n-Sum encryption is configurable: while S1 uncovers the bare con-
tent of the sets, S2 and S3 offer security at a level which is probably sufficient for
casual PSI, while S4 and S5 may be suitable for more sensitive (e.g. financial and
governmental) applications of PSI. Malicious brute-force decryption, or equivalently
submitting a huge set of every possible element to troll for matches, doesn’t pay:
not only does the computational burden become formidable for S3 and above, but
a huge set intersected with a small one has a very low percentage-wise overlap, so
(e.g. Figure 4) the intersection will contain mostly false positives. The most effective
matching is expected to be a small submission against another small submission, so
this technique is ideal for finding rare matches between users in a large pool that
otherwise wouldn’t easily find each other.
Uncertainty or ‘fuzzy matching’ is a side effect which may actually be advanta-
geous. Oftentimes communication does not require exact clarity, but rather approx-
imate accuracy on the first pass.12 Furthermore, as we saw above fuzziness makes
brute-force decryption much harder to interpret.
Finally, one can imagine various usage scenarios: in one scenario there is a public
file server where one can freely upload and download (encrypted) sets [14]; the server
12‘Hearsay’ is also a fuzzy mode of communication which enjoys the features of being certain
enough to be highly useful in daily life, but too uncertain to be used in court to reap punishment. It
is safe, cheap talk. Such modes of communication probably naturally evolve in systems to optimize
collective results [13].
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thus might maintain a directory of all submissions, a mix of sets encrypted with
different security levels and different M , perhaps, and anyone can intersect with their
own set and initiate an exchange. At the opposite extreme, a closed boardroom-type
scenario would utilize a small private server to collect and compare submissions from
invited participants. Also, in the scenario of a location-based smartphone app, one
might initiate a Bluetooth exchange with other nearby devices subject to certain
constraints, e.g. set size, security level, user identity/trustworthiness, and of course
proximity.
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Appendix A: n-Sum Encryption
The following runs in Python 2.6.7
# N-Sum encryption for any N
# BEFORE RUNNING: put this script and "omegaO2.txt"
# (https://github.com/nkersting/WordNet) in the same directory.
# USAGE: Simply run this script and, when prompted, enter the message
# you wish to encrypt.
# OUTPUT: Sorted list of encryption keys written to "keys.txt", one per line
##################################################################
# This script produces usable sum-encrypted messages, but there are still some
# additional needed improvements. For example,
# 1. tokenization, e.g. handle punctuation (note convert "read." to "read"
# but not "U.S." to "U.S")
# 2. lemmatization, e.g. convert plural nouns to singular (WordNet has no plurals)
# 3. hash words not in the dictionary to unused unique integers
# (WordNet uses integers between 0 and roughly 1.6*10^7)
# 4. compound words (connected with "_")
# 5. Part of Speech differentiation
import csv
import shlex
###################################################################
def MapEntry(entryword, syndict, stopwords):
if (syndict.has_key(entryword) and entryword not in stopwords):
return syndict[entryword]
else:
return []
###################################################################
def SumWordsDFSRecursive(currwords, index, syndict, stopwords, sublist, sumdict):
if index == len(currwords):
total = sum(sublist) # key computed here
if (sumdict.has_key(total) == False):
sumdict[total] = []
for item in sublist:
sumdict[total].append(item) # build the inverted dictionary
return
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for entry in MapEntry(currwords[index], syndict, stopwords):
templist = sublist[:]
templist.append(entry)
SumWordsDFSRecursive(currwords, index+1, syndict, stopwords, templist,
sumdict)
return
###################################################################
def SumNEncrypt(userwords, currwords, syndict, stopwords, N, sumdict):
if len(currwords) == N:
sublist = []
SumWordsDFSRecursive(currwords, 0, syndict, stopwords, sublist, sumdict)
return
for i in range(0, len(userwords)): # iterate over all n-element combinations
newwords = currwords[:]
newwords.append(userwords[i])
SumNEncrypt(userwords[i+1:], newwords, syndict, stopwords, N, sumdict)
return
###################################################################
def main():
N = 2 # change this for the desired security level sN
stopwords = [] # append words to ignore, such as "a", "the", "it", etc.
synfile = "omegaO2.txt" # map file defines M: x -> Omega_x
outfile = open("keys.txt", "w") # output as a text file, one key per line
synReader = csv.reader(open(synfile,’rb’), delimiter=’ ’) # read map file
syns = []
for synline in synReader:
syns.append(synline)
syndict = {} # convert to a dictionary for faster access
for entryline in syns:
syndict[entryline[0]] = [int(x) for x in entryline[1:]]
usertext = raw_input(’Message to encrypt: ’) # user input
userwords = shlex.split(usertext)
sumdict = {}
SumNEncrypt(userwords, [], syndict, stopwords, N, sumdict) # encryption here
for key in sorted(sumdict.keys()): # write output with one sum per line
outfile.write(str(key) + ’\n’)
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Appendix B: Overlapping Shapes Code
This was used for the toy example in Section 3
def RandRect(collection, worldDim):
maxDim = 10
minDim = 5
passed = False
while (not passed):
passed = True
x = random.randint(1, worldDim - maxDim) # ensure colonies inside borders
y = random.randint(1, worldDim - maxDim)
width = random.randint(minDim, maxDim)
height = random.randint(minDim, maxDim)
for member in collection:
x2 = member[0]
y2 = member[1]
width2 = member[2]
height2 = member[3]
if (x + width >= x2 and # ensure each country’s colonies
y <= y2 + height2 and # non-self-intersecting
y + height >= y2 and
x <= x2 + width2):
passed = False
collection.append((x,y,width,height))
return
####################################
def MakeHash(worldDim): # hash sequence to large unused integers
maxHash = 100000000 # store the reverse hash as well
topInt = worldDim * worldDim # maxHash must be chosen large enough
used = set() # to make the encryption give useful results,
posHash = {} # but not so large that decryption easily
revHash = {} # betrays the input set
for i in range(1, topInt + 1):
passed = False
while (not passed):
key = random.randint(1,maxHash)
if (key not in used):
used.add(key)
posHash[i] = key
revHash[key] = i
passed = True
return posHash, revHash
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###################################
def MakeSumDict(posHash): # constructs look-up dictionary
sumToPoints = {} # for brute-force decryption
allkeys = posHash.keys()
for i in range (0, len(allkeys)):
for j in range (i, len(allkeys)):
s = posHash[allkeys[i]] + posHash[allkeys[j]]
if (sumToPoints.has_key(s) == False):
sumToPoints[s] = []
sumToPoints[s].append(allkeys[i])
sumToPoints[s].append(allkeys[j])
return sumToPoints
####################################
def MapSumsToPoints(sumlist, sumToPoints):
candidates = set()
for s in sumlist:
for v in sumToPoints[s]:
candidates.add(v)
return candidates
###############################
def FillColonyOmega(colonies, positionHash, worldDim):
omega = {}
count = 0
for colony in colonies:
count += 1
vals = []
for i in range(0,colony[2]):
for j in range(0,colony[3]):
vals.append(positionHash[colony[0] + i + worldDim*(colony[1] + j)])
omega[str(count)] = vals
return omega
##########################################
def PointToCoords(point, worldDim):
x = point % worldDim
y = point / worldDim
return x, y
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##################################
def main():
N = 10 # number of colonies in each collection
worldDim = 50 # number of grid units on each side of the world
random.seed()
usertext = ""
for i in range (1, N+1): # fake ’message’
usertext += (str(i) + ’ ’) # describing the colonies 1 .. N
userwords = shlex.split(usertext)
# hash from coordinate position to particular random int
positionHash, reverseHash = MakeHash(worldDim)
colonies1 = []
for i in range(0,N):
RandRect(colonies1, worldDim)
colonies2 = []
for i in range(0,N):
RandRect(colonies2, worldDim)
omega1 = FillColonyOmega(colonies1, positionHash, worldDim)
omega2 = FillColonyOmega(colonies2, positionHash, worldDim)
sumdict1 = {}
stopwords = []
SumNEncrypt(userwords, [], omega1, stopwords, 2, sumdict1)
sumdict2 = {}
stopwords = []
SumNEncrypt(userwords, [], omega2, stopwords, 2, sumdict2)
sumlist1 = set(sumdict1.keys())
sumlist2 = set(sumdict2.keys())
overlap = sumlist1.intersection(sumlist2) # keys in the intersection
encryptedPoints1 = set() # true and false positives here
encryptedPoints2 = set()
for commCrypt in overlap:
for comm in sumdict1[commCrypt]:
encryptedPoints1.add(comm)
for comm in sumdict2[commCrypt]:
encryptedPoints2.add(comm)
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true1 = set() # S_1 for one colony
for key in omega1.keys():
for val in omega1[key]:
true1.add(val)
true2 = set()
for key in omega2.keys():
for val in omega2[key]:
true2.add(val)
trueoverlap = true1.intersection(true2) # these is the actual intersection
firstCollection = [] # coordinates of apparent intersection
for point in encryptedPoints1:
x, y = PointToCoords(reverseHash[point], worldDim)
firstCollection.append([x,y,1,1])
secCollection = []
for point in encryptedPoints2:
x, y = PointToCoords(reverseHash[point], worldDim)
secCollection.append([x,y,1,1])
decryptCollection = [] # coordinates of brute-force decrypted intersection
sumDict = MakeSumDict(positionHash)
candidates = MapSumsToPoints(sumlist1, sumDict)
for c in candidates:
x, y = PointToCoords(c, worldDim)
decryptCollection.append([x,y,1,1])
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